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With the beginning of airline deregulation in 1978, U.S. domestic opera- 
tions were in for a period of turmoil, adjustment, vibrancy, entrepreneur- 
ship, and change. A great deal has been written about the effects of 
deregulation on airlines and their personnel, and on the public at large. 
Less attention has been paid to the effects on travel agents and on the 
seminal role of computerized reservation systems (CRSs) in the flowering 
of travel agencies. This article examines both of these phenomena. 
The travel agent has always had a nodal role in selling the stock in 
trade of the air carriers, their seats. Without travel agents, air car- 
riers would have to set up costly distribution systems of their own. 
With the ubiquitous presence of travel agents throughout the length 
and breadth of the land, airlines have been saved the considerable 
expense of investing in their own bricks and mortar, personnel, etc, 
leaving themselves free to put this money into, and to concentrate on, 
the direct provision of armchairs in the sky. 
As it is, most major airlines still keep a presence of their own in 
certain select, prestigious, upscale communities located in major 
metropolitan areas. These are, however, exceptions. The eyes and ears 
of air carriers are, and have been, the travel agents. Agencies have, 
in the past, frequently been relatively small, undercapitalized, "mom 
and pop," shoestring operations.l Nevertheless, they still performed 
an essential function for the airlines. Their goodwill was assiduously 
courted, even by the highest flying carriers. 
Since deregulation, the role of the travel agent has undergone what 
amounts to a metamorphosis. Historically important, the travel agent 
has now assumed a crucial role for air carriers in their marketing strate- 
gies. Perhaps the most obvious change that has occurred has been the 
vast proliferation of agency outlets since deregulation. Exhibit 1 shows 
this development, together with the parallel change in travel agencies' 
sales and commission rates. 
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Exhibit 1 
navel Agency Locations, Sales, and Commission Rates 
(Sales in Billions) 
Agency Commission 
Year Locations Sales (a) Rate (b) 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 (June) 
15,053 
16,628 
18,121 
17,339 (d) 
19,203 
20,962 
23,059 
26,037 
26,297 
(a) Includes sales of foreign flag carriers. 
(b) Average of domestic and international. 
(c) Includes credit card sales for the first time 
(d) About 2,000 Canadian agents no longer reported. 
Source: Air Transport Association 
As can be readily seen, the number of travel agency locations has 
increased from 15,053 in 1977, the year before deregulation, to 26,297 
in mid-1985, or about a 75 percent increase; sales have increased more 
than two and a half times, from $9.4 billion to $33.4 billion; and com- 
missions have jumped almost 23 percent, from 8.3 to 10.2 percent. In 
the process, travel agencies have increased their share of industry sales, 
domestically and internationally, from 57 percent in 1978 to 74 per- 
cent in 1983. 
What has also happened is that the industry has undergone several 
fundamental changes in the wake of these impressive increases in loca- 
tions, sales, and commissions. Exhibit 1 refers only to agency loca- 
tions, not the number of travel agencies per ~e.~ Although locations 
have been proliferating, it has been largely because of the growth in 
cooperative agency groups - such as Association Travel Nationwide, 
Hickory Associates, Nova Associates, and Travel Trust International 
- as well as the large, single management agencies such as Ameri- 
can Express, Ask Mr. Foster, and Thomas Cook - U.S.A., not the tradi- 
tional, independently-owned, free-standing travel agencies. 
Technology Has Caused Changes 
Perhaps the single most important factor in the changing nature 
of the domestic travel agency business has been the change in tech- 
nology. Although the new technology predated deregulation, it has 
really come into its own in response to the deregulation phenomenon. 
In order to compete more effectively in a deregulated environment, 
the larger air carriers have installed a complex computerized system 
to manage their reservations, ticketing procedures, and flight schedul- 
ing. Only travel agencies that have been able to buy or lease their own 
terminals and keep up with all the costs associated with an expensive 
and rapidly-changing technology have been able to survive3 
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Access to the latest technology has not been the only prerequisite 
for travel agents successfully surviving the anfractuosity of regula- 
tion deregulation. Equally as important has been the need to develop 
managerial skills that can cope with the complex morass of ever- 
changing fares. Just staying on top of this kaleidoscope has earned 
successful travel agents their increased commissions. Not surprisingly, 
it is becoming more difficult for a travel agent to have the necessary 
capital and managerial skills and still operate as a businessman who 
is a sole proprietor - the classic atomistic competitor described by 
economists. Larger scale organization is now required. 
Prior to the Airline Deregulation Act, travel agents had exclusive 
rights to sell air transportation to the public At that time the Air Wfic 
Conference (ATC) controlled travel agency accreditation and the air- 
line ticket settlement system. Airlines were not permitted to utilize 
any other means for selling their tickets other than a travel agent 
accredited through the ATC. . 
Clearly, in an era of deregulation, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 
- disbanded on December 31,1984 - could hardly allow travel agents 
to continue to operate with exclusivity provisions - in effect, a trade 
monopoly. These exclusivity provisions had also been granted antitrust 
immunity since the CAB had been established back in 193Ei4 
The end result was a compromise of the sort where the travel agents 
had their cake and, in effect, ate it, too. A new organization was estab- 
lished by the Air Transport Association (ATA), the air industry's trade 
association, called the Airline Reporting Corporation (ARC). This 
absorbed the old ATC and set up somewhat more liberal arrangements 
in which formerly and newly-accredited travel agents became "indus- 
try agents" and other outlets, with at least one airline's business, 
became "other persons1' Who was it who said, 
"Plus ca change, plus que la meme chose"? 
Technology was the main implement of change in the travel agency 
business. Deregulation provided the overall umbrella; the need to keep 
track of the whirlwind of route, price, carrier, and time alternatives 
was the immediate goal. The answer that came was a harassed agent's 
dream - the airline computer reservation system, or CRS for short.5 
Aside from the previously mentioned need to obtain the requisite 
computer terminals and other equipment, and to train employees, there 
has been one major problem associated with CRSs. This problem is 
not of the travel agent's making. The problem is that the airlines have 
been competing furiously with each other since deregulation. Marketing 
has been their main arena. One tool of marketing is a reservations 
system, particularly one established by an airline itself, and most of 
the majors have done just that. Exhibit 2 shows the shares of the vari- 
ous competing computer reservations systems in all American travel 
agencies. 
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Exhibit 2 
Computer Reservations Systems Shares 
in All Travel Agencies 
CRS 
APOLLO (United) 
DATAS I1 (Delta) 
MARS PLUS (Tymshare) 
PARS (TWA) 
SABRE (American) 
SODA (Eastern) 
UNAUTOMATED 
Totals 
Number 
3,865 
688 
344 
2,159 
5,692 
1,075 
7,546 
21,369 
Revenues 
(billions) 
4.041 
.260 
.282 
1.561 
6.376 
.605 
1.823 
14,948 
Source: EN0 Foundation for Transportation, Inc 
The first two systems to come on line were United Airlines' APOLLO 
in 1976 and American Airlines' SABRE, followed later by TWA's PARS. 
As can be seen from Exhibit 2, the three airlines that were the first 
to establish on-line computer reservations systems are the ones with 
both the largest number of outlets and the largest shares of domestic 
revenues today. The only change is that SABRE has overtaken 
APOLLO as the leading computer system. 
The problem in all of this lies with the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
which sees possible antitrust violations, particularly on the part of the 
leading providers of computerized reservations. Exhibit 3 illustrates 
the problem from the DOJ's perspective. In 1984, it was established 
that 90 percent of travel agents were using computerized reservation 
systems to ticket their airline passengers, accounting for more than 
90 percent of total airline bookings made through travel agents. With 
65 percent of domestic bookings being made through travel agents, 
then almost 59 percent (.90 x .65) of the domestic passenger bookings 
were being handled by computerized systems in 1984.= In particular, 
United and American controlled 41 percent of all bookings, 69 per- 
cent of the CRSs located in travel agencies, obtaining 80 percent of 
the domestic revenues from these CRS locations. 
Exhibit 3 
Airlines Systems Proportions 
of Total CRS Revenues 
APOLLO (United) 3,865 28 4.041 3 1 
DATAS I1 (Delta) 688 5 .260 2 
MARS PLUS (Qmshare) 344 2 .282 2 
PARS (TWA) 2,159 16 1.561 12 
SABRE (American) 5,692 41 6.376 49 
SODA (Eastern) 1,075 8 .605 5 
'Ibtals 13,822 100 13.125 100 
Source: Exhibit 2. 
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Revenue Is Concentrated 
Another way of looking at the Department of Justice's concern is 
to understand, from Exhibit 2, that 65 percent of travel agency loca- 
tions produced 88 percent of domestic revenues. 
In and of itself, such concentmtion may have produced no more than 
some momentary qualms on the part of the DOJ, later to be overcome 
by the thought that in classical economics, the more efficient, more 
effective competitor can expect to obtain a sales advantage over his 
less efficient opponent. This concentration in the CRS was not, how- 
ever, the whole story by any means. The airlines that created the vari- 
ous computer reservation systems controlled, of course, the 
programming of these systems. Naturally, American would present its 
flights first on its SABRE system; United would do so on APOLLO.' 
Travel agents, being busy people, would tend to go with what appeared 
first, or early, on the cathode ray tube (CRT) screen, unless pressed 
by their customers. Exhibits 2 and 3 have already indicated how profita- 
ble all this was to American and United. Their competitors cried "Foul!" 
and investigations by the DOJ and the almost moribund CAB were 
initiated. The main charge that both investigated was of "display bias" 
That is, neither American nor United were dominating the market 
because of their inherently superior air transportation services but 
because of the selectivity in their presentation compared with their 
competitors'. 
For now, the matter rests there. American's and United's competi- 
tors are trying to come up with an alternative to SABRE and 
APOLLO. These competitors have also initiated a formal antitrust suit 
against the two dominant airlines. 
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